INTRODUCTION
In Food Politics: How the Food Industry Influences Nutrition and Health, Marion Nestle (Nestle, 2002) describes the often covert tactics used by the food industry to influence what people eat. These tactics, at times, involve the cooption of nutrition professionals and researchers. As one example, Nestle quotes an industry guide to working with academic experts: [This] is most effectively done by identifying leading experts…and hiring them as consultants or advisers, or giving them research grants and the like. This activity requires a modicum of finesse; it must not be too blatant, for the experts themselves must not recognise that they have lost their objectivity and freedom of action. At a minimum, a programme of this kind reduces the threat that the leading experts will be available to testify or write against the interests of the regulated firms [ (Nestle, 2002) , p. 111].
While such an approach does not apply to all food companies, the implication that some firms and industry peak bodies do not always play fairly in their relationships with health professionals raises important questions for the development of 'intersectoral collaborations' aimed at structural or environmental change. There is necessarily a fine line between 'win-win' collaborations, which recognise that each party Key words: food industry; intersectoral partnerships; nutrition
SUMMARY

In 1986, the Ottawa Charter alerted a new generation of health promotion practitioners to the benefits of working with the non-health sectors, including the commercial sector. Since then, the establishment of partnerships with government and non-government bodies has been advanced as a positive way of fostering policies that enhance health and well-being. The food and nutrition field has enthusiastically adopted partnerships between government, nongovernment and industry. In this article, we focus on the tactics employed by industry bodies to further their cause in a range of fields that are characterized by risk and contestation. We describe the nature of the alliances and interactions between commercial, scientific and government groups whose stated aim is to improve Australia's diet.
Our analysis shows that these partnerships have been guided less by the ethos of the Ottawa Charter and more by the interests of the various parties: namely the food industry's need for credibility in making health claims, the financial imperatives of professional bodies and scientists whose public funding is inadequate, and government endorsement of public-private partnerships as the preferred mechanism for service delivery. The symbiotic relationship that is emerging between segments of the food industry and the nutrition professions raises questions about the independence of the dietary advice being given to consumers. We conclude by arguing for a research programme to investigate the consequences of intersectoral partnerships on the nutritional status of the population.
will seek to meet its own goals, and manipulation by the more powerful partner.
In this paper we describe the alliances and interactions between commercial interests, scientists, health professionals and government authorities. We explain the pressures for different interests to work together, and illustrate the strategies being adopted with numerous examples. The paper draws on two strands of research. The first involves a synthesis of how different authors explain the influence of corporations in the tobacco, environment, nutrition and pharmaceutical fields. In each area, corporations use their associations with professional bodies and government agencies along with appeals to science to build trust in systems that citizens perceive to be ethically flawed, dangerous or puzzling. The second aspect of the research involves an examination of examples of partnerships between actors in the Australian food and nutrition system, for the period 1995-2001. We reviewed nutrition and dietetics journals, food industry and professional newsletters, and food and nutrition conference programmes and events. In pursuing relevant materials, we were guided by two questions. First, in what ways does the food industry seek-explicitly and, more interestingly, implicitly-to influence or capitalize on health advice that supports its products? Secondly, how does it set about neutralizing messages that do not support its products? The examples reveal that many partnerships forged for the purposes of health promotion are likely to be a mix of innocent actions, strategic actions, actions of equal and consenting partners, and industry co-option, as described by Nestle.
Background: the 'power of partnerships'
Over the past two decades, a model of health promotion has emerged that places increasing emphasis on the importance of working closely with other sectors in order to achieve change in the upstream determinants of health. This approach stems from recognition of the limitations of a reliance on educational approaches focused on individual behaviour change to improve health. Contemporary health promotion theory and practice has shifted from an oppositional view of the producers of unhealthy policies, products and environments, to one that advocates influence through engagement and partnership building. This trend has coincided with changes in the political landscape that have seen support for government intervention decline and the ascent of market forces.
This trajectory is well illustrated in the themes and statements of the World Health Organization (WHO) auspiced series of global conferences on health promotion. The first conference in 1986, which gave rise to the still definitive statement of health promotion's meaning and purpose [The Ottawa Charter of Health Promotion (WHO, 1986) In the sphere of food and nutrition the benefits of working with the non-health and commercial sectors gathered a great deal of traction. The apparently highly successful partnerships built between the heart disease prevention demonstration programme 'Heartbeat Wales' in the UK and the supermarket industry suggested the potential 'win-win' gains if the health and food industry sectors could learn to work as allies and not enemies (Parish, 1992) .
By the late 1980s, papers were starting to appear extolling the virtues of food industry involvement in nutritional issues (Mullis and Shannon, 1987) . In a review of environmental strategies to support dietary change, Glanz and colleagues concluded that emphasis should be given to 'building capacity to undertake new initiatives, enhancing evaluation and surveillance (Glanz et al., 1995) , p. 524 (emphasis added)].
In the field of nutrition promotion, a plethora of initiatives have developed to build connections with industry, ranging from the Heart Foundation's 'Pick the Tick' initiative, which began in the late 1980s, through to the recent partnership between the Dietitians Association of Australia (DAA) and Coles Supermarkets with the '7 a Day' programme. Despite these initiatives, little analysis has been forthcoming of the background strategies of, in particular, the larger, multinational food companies which help to define the stage on which the more overt activities occur. It is to the generic strategies of the corporate sector in shaping the symbolic and regulatory environments that we now turn.
Influence strategies
We compare below how three different studies describe corporate attempts to manage risk to corporate operations. In each case, the industries are under pressure to blunt any negative messages concerning their activities and products, to promote trust in the safety of what they sell, and to restore their own credibility with a public that is suspicious of the claims made by groups with perceived vested interests. Table 1 shows how Beder has categorized the wide range of corporate strategies used against the environment movement (Beder, 1997) . Table 2 summarizes Ong and Glanz's case study of the campaign used by the tobacco industry to discredit the science linking secondhand smoke with lung cancer and other diseases (Ong and Glanz, 2000) .
The co-option of professional groups through informal and apparently 'spontaneous' alliances with patient groups and corporations can also be seen in approaches employed by drug companies. Moynihan and co-workers (Moynihan et al., 2002) comment that:
Pharmaceutical companies are actively involved in sponsoring the definition of diseases and promoting them to both prescribers and consumers. The social construction of illness is being replaced by corporate construction of disease… Within many disease categories informal alliances have emerged, comprising drug company staff, doctors, and consumer groups. Ostensibly engaged in raising public awareness about underdiagnosed and untreated problems, these alliances tend to promote a view of their particular condition as widespread, serious, and treatable.
[ (Moynihan et al., 2002), p. 886.] Drawing on these various frameworks and the work of Caswell (Caswell, 1991) , we suggest that food industry efforts to shape the food choice environment in Australia can be categorized in three domains of strategic action. The domains comprise tactics that aim to: (i) neutralize and pre-empt opposition; (ii) use health and nutrition organizations as a source of third party endorsement; and (iii) shape a supportive regulatory environment within which health claims about food are made. Table 3 summarizes these strategies, and in the following section we provide examples that involve food industry partnerships (Beder, 1997) Establishment of front groups and think tanks Use of lawsuits to limit public participation Co-option of environmentalists to speak for industry Industry-funded research Financing pro-industry education programmes for schools Hiring public relations firms to influence the media agenda and framing of the public debate Hiring professional lobbyists to influence regulatory decisions Table 2 : Tobacco company strategies: a summary of the campaign used by the tobacco industry to discredit the science linking second-hand smoke with lung cancer and other diseases (Ong and Glanz, 2000) Scientific strategy Establish network of sympathetic consultants to help the industry 'produce research or stimulate controversy' Question the research methodology being used by bodies considered to be hostile to the industry Identify competing interests among members of key scientific committees Attempt to sit on committees overseeing the research
Communications strategy
Develop a communications programme…in advance of the study results Develop a contingency plan, should the preliminary results be leaked Assemble a crisis communications team/plan to manage the impact of the release of the study Develop a programme to generate support for 'junk science' and education on use and abuse in epidemiology, possibly through a coalition on bad science with health professionals, researchers and government.
AUSTRALIAN CASE EXAMPLES
Neutralize and pre-empt opposition
Promoting corporate citizenship through corporate research Increasingly, food manufacturers have become direct sponsors of nutrition research. The most sophisticated communicate their research in contexts that act as public relations vehicles for the corporation, by creating a backdrop for the launch of research results with scientific and political respectability. This respectability, or cultural capital, can be used to deflect criticism from consumer and public health organizations. Breakfast cereal manufacturers are especially good proponents of this approach. In 1998, Kellogg Australia announced a new initiative, entitled 'Facts for Life'. The information kit contained a research report focusing on the extent of nutrition confusion among consumers. The kit and an associated nutrition education strategy was launched by the then Commonwealth Minister for Health at a Summit of leading nutrition and public health experts convened to examine how consumer confusion over health and nutrition messages could be reduced (Anonymous, 1998) .
Business magazines provided insights into why Kellogg was attempting to seek a high profile in health and nutrition circles and to shape dietary discourse at this time. In 1998, the company was reported to have lost its biggest percentage share of the breakfast cereal market in Australia for 71 years, despite owning eight of the 10 best selling brands [ (Shoebridge, 1998), p. 51] . In an interview with Business Review Weekly, the incoming managing director outlined the six areas on which he would concentrate to reverse the situation, with a particular emphasis upon product innovation and nutrition education. The journalist wrote that Kellogg aimed to re-ignite 'consumer interest in breakfast cereal and reverse the decline in market share by promoting the nutritional value of breakfast cereal and developing innovative products' [ (Shoebridge, 1998) , p. 52]. The article suggested that the Facts for Life kit was not borne out of a desire to address consumer concerns, but out of a need 'to counter recent attacks on the nutritional value of ready-to-eat cereals and restore consumer confidence in the category'.
Researching opposition to the food industry
Discrediting corporate critics has been a feature of the tobacco industry and polluting industries for several decades, and similar tactics are now evident in the food arena. Two examples are given below.
In the early 1990s, the Meat Research Council (MRC) and the Australian Meat and Livestock Corporation (AMLC) commissioned a report that it could use to counteract the arguments and activities of what it called 'anti-meat public campaigners' internationally and in Australia. The MRC wanted research to counter the arguments of opponents of the industry, as well as 'positive arguments which support the Australian meat and livestock industry' (Sykes, 1992) . The report began by noting the commissioning bodies' concern with the publication of Jeremy Rifkin's book Beyond Beef, particularly 'the underlying messages of anti-capitalism and anti-speciesism'. The report provided the AMLC with material for the advocacy of meat consumption, as well as arguments for discrediting vegetarians, and animal welfare and environmental groups.
The second example concerns the public undermining of one of Australia's leading nutritionists, Rosemary Stanton, who has being singled out repeatedly by the processed food industry and some medical researchers for being 'one-sided', 'emotional' and 'a critic of the food industry'. Reflecting this public feuding, The Bulletin magazine ran a cover story: The Food Industry's Public Enemy No. 1 and the Diet Debate. In a range of interviews, Stanton was portrayed as widely respected by public health 8 J. Dixon et al. 
Using nutritionists and dietitians as media spokespeople
Women's magazines have traditionally been a popular medium for companies and nutritionists to promote particular products and food practices. Often, new foods and food messages are launched in these magazines. In this context they are an important medium for food companies to monitor and take 'corrective action'.
In a letter to her colleagues in the Dietitians Association of Australia newsletter, a consultant working with a Kellogg PR firm expressed 'amazement' at the amount of misinformation promoted in the media. She wrote 'I am especially concerned about recent nutrition articles which have appeared in Woman's Day. As part of my role as a nutrition consultant to food industry, I often write to the writers and editors of publications expressing my concern about inaccurate nutrition reporting, usually I get a response and often action is taken'. She concluded by encouraging all nutritionists to set the record straight. 'By doing this we have the opportunity to educate media, ensure correct information is printed, position the profession as experts in nutrition and possibly create a position for ourselves or colleagues' [ (Davies, 1998) 
Using reputable bodies to advance the science supportive of industry products
In early 1998, the Australian Sugar Industry's (ASI) Nutrition Consultant wrote to key food and nutrition professionals and educators to announce that the ASI would launch a new campaign promoting sugar in moderation (Australian Sugar Industry, undated). Accompanying the letter and fact sheets were two papers. One was written by the Chief of the Nutrition Programmes Service (FAO): Is Sugar 'Pure, White and Deadly'? (Clay, undated) , a reference to a book by John Yudkin (some commentators would argue that Yudkin's book has done more to question the nutritional worth of sugar than any other text.). The other was a paper published in Nutrition Research, which concluded that continued efforts to reduce sugar consumption were wasteful because they are inconsistent with the scientific evidence (Anderson, 1997) .
CSIRO's Human Nutrition Division appears frequently as a scientific commentator in the Australian context in relation to the food industry. Repeatedly commissioned to research the nutrient content of single commodities and consumer attitudes and behaviours, CSIRO scientists become defacto spokespersons for particular foods. One notable example has been the organization's work for the red meat peak industry body, Meat and Livestock Australia (MLA).
In late 1999, a kit of material released by MLA contained a CSIRO analysis of the National Nutrition Survey, and concluded in bold that 'The intake of red meat in Australia has declined, with significant implications for the nutritional health of Australians' (MLA, 2000) . The accompanying letter stressed that '…MLA research shows a wide range of issues have created confusion and undermined consumer and health professionals' confidence in meat's important role in the diet'. At the same time, thousands of health professionals around the country were receiving another MLA fact sheet distributed with their professional newsletters: Is Meat Intake Linked to Increased Risk of Colorectal Cancer? (Trusswell, 1999) . This attempt to promote the interests of the red meat industry through the use of scientists and the medical profession unfortunately backfired. In the alleged quest to alleviate consumer confusion, some negative but illuminating publicity was generated by a rare instance of attack on personal integrity among medical experts. Two professors of nutrition issued press releases questioning the other's impartiality due to their respective sources of research sponsorship. Under media banners Dietary Confusion as Vested Interests Claim Authority (Whelan, 2000a) and Nutrition Advice is Given for Profit, says Professor [ (Whelan, 2000b) , p. 8], readers were told that 'virtually all announcements about the links between diet and disease are commercially driven'.
Since this incident, more examples of corporate sponsorship of messages that coincide with commercial interests have been reported. Under the headline Diet Message Funded by Food Giants (McKenzie, 2001) , some background was provided to a community service announcement from the Dietitians Association of Australia, in which the association's president argued that breakfast cereal could improve student exam results. There was no mention that the Australian Dairy Corporation paid for the advertisement's production. Nor was there any mention that cereal manufacturers are 'generous' supporters of the association, which has over 2000 members. The article pointed out that in the 2 years that the association had embarked upon a marketing support programme, its income from sponsorship and advertising had quadrupled and was almost equivalent to its membership dues.
In research on the impacts of cooperative arrangements between food companies and scientific and professional bodies, Tobin and colleagues questioned the practices of some major US professional bodies, including the American Heart Association, American Cancer Association and American Dietetic Association. They concluded that 'On the evidence thus far, it appears that endorsement of food products entails a high risk of confusion and of misunderstanding by the general public. Consumers may assume that the professional group making the endorsement believes the food has special health-promoting properties' [ (Tobin et al., 1992), p. 306] .
This has been a risk faced by Australia's National Heart Foundation (NHF), in its product endorsement programme. In 1989, the NHF launched the Pick the Tick food approval programme to help shoppers choose healthy food. In 1994, a survey of 1200 adults confirmed that the Australian public regards the NHF as Australia's most credible health organization. Despite its various positive aspects, the programme has been criticized, with the suggestion that consumers interpret the logo to mean that you can eat as much of the foods with the tick logo as you like (Scott and Worsley, 1994) .
Shaping the regulatory environment
In an era of food overproduction, food producers cannot afford for their products to be part of the proportion of food that is not consumed. The intensity of competition in the food industry is shaped by the logic of finite demand that almost no other industry sector faces. Nestle has noted that the US food supply in the late 1990s provided an average of 3800 kcal per day for every man, woman and child in the country [ (Nestle, 2002), p. 8] . However, most adults need one-half to two-thirds of that amount, and children even less. If food companies are to maintain growth and market share, their two-fold task is to convince consumers to continue to eat more than they need and to claim that their products are superior. One of the most important arenas in which this struggle for advantage is played out is the regulatory environment. Government food regulations determine what food manufacturers can and cannot produce, the health claims they can make and the health messages that can be used in advertisements. Securing a sympathetic regulatory environment is an onerous undertaking, involving three main tactics: lobbying, sitting on government committees and providing expert advice.
As in other countries, two food regulations have galvanized Australia's food industry, its allies and opponents over the last decade: food fortification and 'health claims'. Both issues have required the Australia New Zealand Food Authority (the chief food regulatory authority for both countries, now Food Standards Australia and New Zealand) to rewrite food standards in a highly charged environment, which was itself the product of extensive lobbying and advocacy by opposing interests.
One standard (A9), which was under review for 12 years, relates to the addition of vitamins and minerals to foods. In March 1994, following extensive industry lobbying, the National Food Standards Council (a ministerial council) voted by a bare majority to permit fortification of vitamins and minerals where there was no risk to public health or safety. Despite substantial opposition, the standard was revised in June 1995, extending the range of micronutrients that could be added, as well as extending the range of foods to which they could be added. The revision also broadened the scope for associated claims to be made regarding the presence of vitamins and minerals so that only 10% of the recommended daily intake, as opposed to one half, need be present.
Within weeks of the ruling, Sanitarium had a folate-fortified cereal on the shelves, and was quickly followed by Kellogg. Whereas Sanitarium promoted fortification as a means of addressing the health needs of particular population groups, Kellogg justified its support for fortification on the basis of aiding Australia's export drive to Asia. As Kellogg explained:
Food regulations frequently have a direct impact on export potential. Fortification of breakfast cereals, and health claims in labelling and advertising are just examples. Flexibility in regulations enables manufacturers to provide products for export with appropriate nutritional profiles, and to communicate the nutritional benefits of products both in Australia and in overseas markets. [ (Kellogg, 1995), p. 12.] Opposing the change were the Australian Consumers Association, the Public Health Association of Australia, the New Zealand Ministry of Health and a small number of nutrition scientists. These bodies shared a concern that there was potential for consumers to misinterpret the claims about folate fortification and that the concept of upper limits of safety had not been fully explored. For some observers, the change in direction in relation to fortification of foods and distancing from the international standard gave a higher priority to trade and commerce than to public health (Sindall et al., 1994) .
The second food standard at the centre of debate prohibited health and health-related claims from being made on food labels and in food advertisements. A health claim allows for a description of the relationship between a food product and its role in disease prevention. Food labelling is a significant marketing tool because of its impact on consumer confidence in food quality and the role it plays in the general discourse of diet and health (Caswell and Padberg, 1992) . Changes in the fortification standards amplified pressure on the Authority to change the health claims standard. However, the Public Health Association of Australia (PHAA) and the Australian Consumers Association argued that there was no evidence to demonstrate that allowing health claims would provide any public health benefit [ (Lawrence, 2001 ), p. 10].
Over a 4-year period, industry groups lined up to support and to modify the standard. Once again, Kellogg provided leadership for change and articulated the urgency felt by the food processing sector to permit health claims in the following terms: 'one of the greatest impediments to the development of innovative food products which promote health is the current prohibition on any use of health claims on labels or in the advertising of food' [ (Williams, 1998), p. 87] .
These debates reveal that much more is at stake in food standards regulation than informing consumers about an individual product's nutritional qualities and health benefits. Achieving influence over the regulatory environment is critical to corporate profits. Obtaining third party endorsement is especially important for establishing the legitimacy of industry to intervene in the regulatory environment.
CONCLUSION
The pursuit of competitive advantage and shareholder value requires active shaping of the cultural environment in which food choices are made, and the co-option of professional and scientific interests to this end. Industry public affairs specialists play a significant role in establishing and maintaining these relationships. Benefits flowing to professionals and researchers from these arrangements include financial support from a resource-rich private sector, symbolic kudos of being associated with high profile media events and a sense of being an influential political player.
While praising Marion Nestle's book, Walter Willett from the Harvard School of Nutrition has taken issue with Nestle's framing of the role of the nutrition community. Willett suggests that Nestle 'largely ignores the complicity of the nutrition field itself' (Willett, 2002) , by which he means the field's inconsistency about the value of particular foods as well as its promotion of diets in the absence of strong evidence. Our own research points towards a different form of complicity. We contend that nutrition and dietetics organizations willingly participate in ventures with the food industry, even though it is apparent that many such alliances confuse product sponsorship and health promotion. This contention is supported indirectly by Nestle [(Nestle, 2002) , p. 21], when she notes how the food industry and the nutrition profession currently speak with one voice when they intone 'there is no such thing as a bad food' and 'eat a balanced diet'.
The power imbalance in many nutrition partnership initiatives begs a question regarding the risks of professional and scientific capture. Their very ubiquity makes them appear benign and unworthy of scrutiny. Our research suggests the very opposite: that the interconnections between industry, the professions, government and science should be evaluated for their impact on consumption habits and nutritional status.
A research programme to investigate the consequences of intersectoral partnerships could start by asking three fundamental questions. Where does independent advice come from if industry is sponsoring public sector researchers to do nutrition research? Do professional bodies feel constrained in their criticism of industry initiatives when their journals and conferences depend on corporate sponsorship? And finally, as government food and nutrition units struggle with inadequate resources, who will adjudicate between different conceptualizations of a healthy food system?
